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 Dramatic technological advances in computers and genomics are radically transforming 
countless aspects of contemporary life, including health care, life expectancy, retirement and 
financial planning, posing opportunities, but also profound ethical and public policy challenges.  
In the future, genetic testing promises to affect many aspects of health care and estimates of life 
expectancy in ways that can significantly shape decisions about various aspects of financial 
planning. Data that include genetic information are, for instance, yielding new insights on how 
best to diagnose, prevent and treat many diseases, from cancer to Alzheimer’s, and revealing 
factors associated with aging and longer or shorter lifespans. Such data can thus potentially 
influence perceived needs for, and pricing of, life, disability and long-term care insurance 
(Calloway 2019), and various other financial products and services.  Individuals who have genes 
that increase risks for Alzheimer’s, for example, may decide to retire earlier and/or try to purchase 
more insurance than they would otherwise, and have different investment goals or needs.  Based 
on genetic information, individuals may also decide not to have children, or to try to screen 
embryos for certain diseases, which may or may not succeed. 
As scholars and others probe how technologies may disrupt and alter financial services and 
pension planning, it is vital to consider how computer, genetic, and other technologies are 
combining and transforming each other to refashion these domains. 
 
The Case of Life Insurers 
The effects on life insurance raise many of these issues in stark relief, and are thus explored 
below, as a case-in-point.  Critical questions emerge, for instance, regarding whether companies 
selling life, disability, and long-term care insurance should have access to consumers’ genetic 
information, and whether certain individuals, due to their genetics, will consequently be denied 
 
 
coverage or face unaffordable prices.  In deciding whether to sell such insurance policies and at 
what price, insurers routinely consider applicants’ risk factors such as smoking and obesity, but 
society is now beginning to ask whether genetic information should be treated differently. 
 
Background Concerning Genetics 
Genes consist of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that in turn is composed largely of four 
nucleotides: guanine, cytosine, thymine, and adenine, (abbreviated GCTA). Sequences of 
thousands of these nucleotides (commonly described using these abbreviations of four ‘letters’) 
code particular proteins that have various functions in the human body. Periodically, one such 
letter mistakenly replaces another – a misspelling.  Some such misspellings are benign, while 
others may selectively harm or help the organism, significantly increasing or decreasing morbidity 
and mortality.   
Technological advances have yielded inexpensive genetic testing, including whole genome 
sequencing.  Over the past two decades, the cost of sequencing one individual’s genome has fallen 
dramatically from several hundred million to less than one thousand dollars (though that current 
cost does not include interpretation of the information). Yet questions of privacy, confidentiality, 
and potential stigma and discrimination emerge. Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies 
such as 23andme have sold their files on one million customers’ genomic information to 
pharmaceutical companies for $60 million (Herper 2015). This raises additional ethical questions 
regarding ownership of such data. The rapid spread and expansion of big data have thus made 
genetic information more cheaply and easily shared, sold, and resold, either with or without 
individuals’ knowledge, understanding, willingness or explicit permission.  Questions surface 
 
 
regarding how readily these data can identify individuals, whether the uses of these shared data 
sets should be limited in any ways, and if so, who and how they should decide.   
With just a few other bits of data about an individual (e.g., date of birth and zip code), 
genomic data can be identifying, raising possibilities of discrimination (Erlich et al. 2014).  Science 
fiction scenarios as in the film Gattaca highlight public fears of potential misuses of genetic data.  
In the US, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA; US Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission 2008) currently bars use of genetic information for health insurance 
underwriting decisions, but not for life, long-term care, or disability insurance. 
The plummeting cost and widening use of genetic testing make these issues ever more 
pressing.  Individuals at risk of serious diseases that are associated with genetic tests may fear loss 
of insurance coverage or higher costs, and thus avoid genetic tests that might aid the prevention, 
diagnosis or treatment of the disease. In the future, for instance, hospitals may sequence the genes 
of all patients who enter the institution, using left over blood samples, and store the information in 
large databanks.  Questions therefore emerge of who should have access to such information – 
whether any researcher, pharmaceutical company, law enforcement official, school, insurer should 
potentially see the data and if so, to what specific information—for example, if certain identifiers 
should first be removed, and if so, which.  US policymakers recently wrestled with a few of these 
dilemmas in revising the so-called Common Rule (Office for Human Resource Protections 2009; 
2016), regulating human subjects research, including use of large biobanks.  The revised Common 
Rule (2016) allows for broad onetime consent for unspecified future research uses, provided 
certain privacy protections are met.  How exactly such regulations will be implemented, what 
unanticipated challenges may arise, what kinds of patient consent may be needed in other 
situations, whether any restrictions should be placed on data sharing, and how.  Questions also 
 
 
persist regarding whether all patients will find these situations acceptable or might avoid certain 
tests or medical care as a result. 
Problems also arise of potential misinterpretation by both providers and patients of 
genetics, statistics (e.g., absolute vs relative risks), and genetic tests (concerning relatively large 
numbers of variants of uncertain significance).  Levels of understanding of genetics are low among 
providers, including most physicians.  Most internists rate their knowledge as very/somewhat poor 
concerning genetics (73.7%) and guidelines for genetic testing (87.1%), and most felt they need 
more training on when to order tests (79%), how to counsel patients (82%), interpret results 
(77.3%), and maintain privacy (80.6%) (Klitzman et al. 2013). 
Concerns arise, too, given noted examples of hacking of data from major corporations and 
institutions.  Violations of confidentiality have occurred through various means, both intended and 
accidental (Rouse et al. 2019). 
 
Challenges Concerning Life Insurance 
Life insurance permits pooling of the financial risks of unanticipated disability, chronic 
disease or premature death, providing a key social value, preventing survivors from becoming 
impoverished after a wage-earner dies.  Large numbers of policyholders come to share these risks. 
But as more consumers obtain genetic testing, often on their own, actuarial risk assessments 
will become more complicated (Klitzman et al. 2014).  Consumers may discover that they possess 
genes that increase their risks of sudden cardiac or other premature death or Alzheimer’s disease 
or other conditions that may require long-term care.  These individuals may not disclose these test 
results to insurers, but buy insurance.  People with highly penetrant genes for diseases that lack 
effective prevention or treatment report being advised to undergo anonymous testing, and if they 
 
 
learn they have the mutation, to purchase life, disability and long-term care insurance (Klitzman 
2012).  Individuals who learn that they have genes associated with increased risks of Alzheimer’s, 
for instance, are 2-3 times more likely to purchase long-term care insurance or to plan to do so 
(Taylor et al. 2010).  Another study of individuals testing for genes associated with Alzheimer’s 
disease found no significant differences in health, life, or disability insurance purchases, but 
individuals who learned that they had these genes were 5.76 times more likely to alter their long-
term care insurance (Zick et al. 2005).  Knowledge asymmetry can result if consumers have such 
information while insurers do not, causing ‘adverse selection’ and uneven playing fields. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) have suggested that asymmetric information could 
significantly affect insurance markets.  Yet in analyzing data on annuities in the UK, Finkelstein 
and Poterba (2004) found that asymmetric information may affect certain aspects of consumer 
behavior, but not others. Specifically, individuals who expected to live longer tend to purchase 
more ‘back-loaded’ policies (that, over time, pay more per year), while people who expect to live 
for shorter periods tend to purchase policies that provide payouts to the consumer’s survivors.  
Nevertheless, asymmetric selection did not appear to affect the size of the annuities purchased 
(Finkelstein and Poterba 2004).  These results suggest the need to look at multiple aspects of life 
insurance policies that such asymmetric knowledge can affect. As one strategy for diminishing 
potential adverse selection, Brown and Warshawsky (2013) have suggested combining annuities 
and long-term care insurance policies, pooling these products.  Whether such an approach will 
reduce adverse selection due to genetic testing is unclear. 
If insurers decide to access genetic information, they could potentially do so in several 
ways:  through family history, medical records, asking applicants if they or family members have 
had genetic tests performed, and asking applicants to undergo such tests.  The growth of electronic 
 
 
health records (EHRs) heightens the accessibility of such data.  Genetic test results are increasingly 
becoming parts of EHRs, and insurance applications regularly request releases of medical records. 
Indeed, insurers are currently debating how to address these issues.  In the UK, life insurers 
have accepted a moratorium on using genetic information (Association of British Insurers 2011).  
In the US, one American life insurance executive has stated that his company would ask for such 
genetic information but did not wish to be the first to do so (Peikoff 2014).  A group of Canadian 
and European authors (Joly et al. 2014) has articulated a set of broad questions requiring further 
examination along these lines. 
In the US, however, life insurers remain uncertain what to do.  Scientific understandings 
of genomics are rapidly evolving.  Though some have argued that ‘genomic information about 
currently known common variants seldom substantially affects mortality risk estimation that is 
already based on phenotype and family history’ (Klitzman et al. 2014, p. 2), genomic risk 
assessments can be more accurate for highly penetrant disorders, than prognostications based on 
family history.  Even in a family whose parents both had breast cancer and carry a BRCA gene, 
for example, a woman may be found to not have the mutation, thereby lowering her risk 
significantly.  Many consumers’ genomic information may ultimately assist diagnosis, treatment 
and prevention, reducing risks.  Knowledge of the presence of certain genes can motivate 
individuals to reduce their risk behaviors and pursue enhanced medical interventions.  Insurers 
will need to appreciate how individuals without mutations for lethal disorders have lower risks 
than do the general population.   
As seen in Table 1, nations differ considerably in how they confront these issues.  For 
instance, France and Germany have established full moratoria on insurers’ use of genetic test 
results, while Australia and Canada have instituted partial moratoria (Knoppers et al. 2004). 
 
 
Table 1 here  
US federal legislation does not directly comment on life, disability, or long-term care 
insurers using genetic information, and state laws range considerably. Vermont and a few other 
states prohibit use of genetic information, while others bar use of genetic tests for certain 
conditions such as sickle-cell trait (e.g., in North Carolina). New York requires specific informed 
consent for genetic testing. Wisconsin requires that underwriting reflects actual risks (National 
Genome Research Institute 2018).  States thus range from ‘strong’ to ‘no protection’.   
Insurers should avoid unfair discrimination, but the meaning of this concept can differ, 
especially in the context of genetics (Klitzman et al. 2014).  Definitions of ‘unfairness’ can involve 
weighing the competing interests of consumers vs. insurers.  Insurance companies that know 
consumers’ genetic test results can stratify risks more accurately. At the same time, insurers may 
make conservative business decisions, overestimating risks in ways that lead to denials of coverage 
or significantly increased costs for certain consumers.   
While scientific knowledge about the roles and predictivness of many genes is rapidly 
advancing, many uncertainties persist. Studies suggesting that particular genes are highly 
associated with certain diseases have frequently failed to be replicated. Genetics research is often 
biased, selectively focusing on severely ill patients, rather than the general population, thus leading 
to overestimations of risks. Use of genetic information could thus result in many individuals 
unjustifiably being priced out of the life insurance market. 
 
Possible Solutions 
To address these concerns, several solutions are possible. First, government policies could 
prohibit all insurers from using any genetic information. In such a case, however, asymmetrical 
 
 
knowledge and adverse selection could ensue.  Presumably, insurance companies would then seek 
to amortize the effect, increasing rates for all consumers.  And some consumers may object, wary 
of individuals with mutations who disproportionately buy insurance. Research is thus needed to 
gauge how potential customers would view these trade-offs.   
Second, insurers could be allowed access to all genetic information they seek.  
Unfortunately, some consumers might then be unable to obtain insurance.  
Third, insurers could be permitted to obtain genetic information only about certain pre-
defined, well-characterized, highly-penetrant genes. Consumers with certain genes who reduce 
their risks through effective treatment or prevention would have prices lowered accordingly. A list 
of such highly predictive tests could be determined, and clearly listed. The number of applicants 
excluded from coverage would thus presumably be reduced. Extreme care and caution would be 
needed, however, since most genes are not very penetrant, and environmental and other factors are 
involved in whether, when and how symptoms may occur. How much insurance prices would vary 
based on the presence or absence of these genes is also unclear. 
Fourth, all individuals could be allowed to obtain a certain modest amount of insurance, 
with insurers able to obtain genetic test results from consumers who wish to buy additional 
coverage. This situation currently exists in the UK, for instance, since individuals there must have 
life insurance to obtain a mortgage. 
Since life insurance provides a social benefit, public policy makers can seek to maximize 
its availability. Accordingly, the option of providing a certain modest amount of insurance to 
everyone may have certain advantages. Currently, in the U.S., social security offers some 
retirement annuity, disability insurance, and survivors’ insurance to all who contribute. Medicaid 
and Supplemental Security Income also provide some long-term care coverage and disability 
 
 
benefits, but they favor lower-income individuals and families.  Moreover, the benefits provided 
for living expenses (as opposed to health care) are relatively limited for many individuals. Some 
employers also offer varying degrees of life insurance coverage, though policies range widely in 
generosity and cost. 
If life insurers do access genetic information, input from genetic and policy experts and 
public transparency will be crucial in establishing which genes should be included. More 
population-based research is also vital to determine accurately the unbiased prevalence and natural 
history of these genetic markers and disorders.  If insurers request information on results of genetic 
tests, significant caution is needed since patients may consequently be wary of undergoing such 
testing, even when it may potentially aid their heath.  Insurance policies could disincentivize 
patients from pursuing genetic testing that may be medically helpful, because of concerns about 
consequent diminished future insurability.  Genetic test results differ from other medical data since 
individuals cannot alter their genes, as they can their weight, diet, and amount of physical exercise.  
An individual’s genetic test results can also unfairly impede family members’ insurability. 
Key questions arise, too, regarding how companies allowed to access genetic information 
would or should do so.  Insurers might only inquire whether individuals or family members have 
histories of certain specific conditions, or ever undergone genetic testing, and if so, to self-report 
the results.  Alternatively, insurers might require potential customers to undergo genetic testing 
and submit the data. 
Major challenges would also arise because many individuals have variants of uncertain 
significance. Given the thousands of letters in each DNA sequence, scientists remain unsure 
whether certain gene variants in fact impose major dangers, cause only slight impairments, are in 
fact benign, or even are protective against a disease. Thus genetic test sequencing yields high 
 
 
amounts of uncertainty, and deep questions arise regarding how insurers will view and handle such 
ambiguities. Companies may want to drastically raise costs for, or exclude many consumers, but 
such decisions may be unwarranted since genetic risks may be minor, unlikely, and/or potentially 
offset by other biological or environmental factors.  
Economic models of the impact of using genetic testing tend to show that outcomes depend 
on the assumptions imposed (MacDonald and Yu 2011; Howard 2014).  One model, for instance, 
assumed that 100 percent of people with a particular high-risk gene will be tested over their 
lifetimes (Howard 2014). Yet this figure seems unrealistically high, at least presently, as well as 
in the near future. Indeed, rates of lifetime uptake of genetic testing in the US remain very low: no 
more than 20 percent of individuals at risk of HD have undergone testing, with only 14.7 percent 
of at-risk individuals doing so over 20 years in Northern Ireland (Morrison et al. 2011).  For 
diseases such as breast cancer, the rates are below about 20 percent (Childers et al. 2017).  Granted, 
such rates may increase if insurance company policies change, yet many people are wary of 
undergoing genetic tests, due to fears of stigma and discrimination. Moreover, the US has very 
few genetic counselors, making it unlikely that consumers could get the information needed when 
they are tested (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2018). 
 
Conclusion 
Federal and state policymakers, industry stakeholders, academic researchers, and others 
need to examine these questions carefully. Public policy in this area could influence whether 
patients opt to undergo genetic tests for medical reasons, ultimately helping or impeding individual 
and public health. 
 
 
These issues also have critical implications for future research, underscoring needs to 
assess consumer attitudes regarding these tradeoffs. For instance, it is not yet known how much 
consumers would pay to avoid genetic testing. Additional research can elucidate views and 
attitudes in ways that might inform government and industry decisions. An examination of 
insurance company policies and decisions regarding genetics is also important. It may also be 
important to establish an independent ombudsoffice to receive and review claims of unfair 
discrimination, when they arise. Public trust in health care providers and institutions, government 
policymakers, and insurers is crucial, as the lives and welfare of countless individuals are at stake.  
Future research is also critical on how these technologies will affect other consumer and industry 
choices as well. For example, it would be important to learn whether and to what degree certain 
consumers will be more or less likely to seek certain kinds or amounts of financial products or 
services, and whether genetic data will affect decisions about financial portfolios and annuity 
pricing, and if so, how, and what challenges will emerge as a result. 
In short, to understand the impact of new technologies on individual and company 
decisions regarding financial products, several complexities need to be considered. Computer 
technologies may alter not only the types of products offered, but also consumers’ preferences 
based on information about themselves that technology provides. The term ‘FinTech’ should, 
arguably, thus be expanded from the way it is now sometimes used, to address how a wide variety 
of new technologies have financial implications for both individuals and financial institutions.  
Given how rapidly computer capabilities and analytics and genomic technologies are advancing 
and evolving, these domains will continue to be critical to monitor and examine. 
  
 
 
Acknowledgements 
This research was funded in part by a grant from the National Human Genome Research Institute: 
P50HG007257. The author has no financial conflicts of interest to disclose. The authors would 
like to thank Kristina Hosi, Charlene Sathi, and especially Patricia Contino, for assistance in 
preparation of this manuscript. 
  
 
 
References 
Association of British Insurers. (2011). Concordat and Moratorium on Genetics and Insurance.
 UK: Association of British Insurers.  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_
data/file/216821/Concordat-and-Moratorium-on-Genetics-and-Insurance-20111.pdf.  
Brown, J. and M. Warshawsky (2013). ‘The Life Care Annuity: A New Empirical Examination
 of an Insurance Innovation that Addresses Problems in the Markets for Life Annuities
 and Long‐term Care Insurance.’ The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 80(3): 677–703. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2018). ‘Occupational Outlook Handbook Genetic Counselors.’ 
 US Department of Labor. https://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/genetic-counselors.htm.  
Callaway, J. (2019). ‘FinTech Disruption: Opportunities to Encourage Financial Responsibility’ 
in J. Agnew and O. S. Mitchell eds., The Disruptive Impact of FinTech on Retirement 
Systems. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. xxx-xxx. 
Childers, C. P., K. K. Childers, M. Maggard-Gibbons, and J. Macinko (2017). ‘National
 Estimates of Genetic Testing in Women with a History of Breast or Ovarian Cancer.’
 Journal of Clinical Oncology, 35(34): 3800-3806. 
Erlich, Y. and A. Narayanan (2014). ‘Routes for Breaching and Protecting Genetic Privacy.’
 Nature Reviews Genetics, 15(6): 409-421. 
Finkelstein, A. and J. Poterba (2004). ‘Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder
 Evidence from the UK. Annuity Market.’ Journal of Political Economy, 112(1): 183-
 208. 
 
 
Herper, M. (2015). ‘Surprise! With $60 Million Genentech Deal, 23andMe has a Business Plan.’ 
Forbes. January 6: https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/01/06/surprise-
with-60-million-genentech-deal-23andme-has-a-business-plan/#40dc97f02be9.  
Howard, R.C.W. (2014). Report to CIA Research Committee: Genetic Testing model: If
 Underwriters Had No Access to Known Results. Document 214082: Canadian Institute of
 Actuaries: http://www.cia-ica.ca/docs/default-source/2014/214082e.pdf.  
Joly, Y., H. Burton, B. M. Knoppers, I. N. Feze, T. Dent, N. Pashayan, N, S. Chowdhury, W.
 Foulkes, A. Hall, P. Hamet, N. Kirwan, A. Macdonald, J. Simard, and I. Van Hoyweghen
 (2014). ‘Life Insurance: Genomic Stratification and Risk Classification.’ European
 Journal of Human Genetics, 22(5): 575-579. 
Klitzman, R., W. Chung, K. Marder, A. Shanmugham, L. J. Chin., M. Stark, C.-S. Leu, and P. S.
 Appelbaum (2013). ‘Attitudes and Practices Among Internists Concerning Genetic
 Testing.’ Journal of Genetic Counseling, 22(1): 90-100. 
Klitzman, R., P. S Appelbaum, and W. K. Chung (2014). ‘Should Life Insurers Have Access to
 Genetic Test Results?’ JAMA, 312(18): 1855-1866. 
Klitzman, R. (2012). Am I My Genes? Confronting Fate and Family Secrets in the Age of
 Genetic Testing. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Knoppers, B. M., Godard, B., and Joly, J. (2004). ‘A. Comparative International Overview,’ in
 M. A. Rothstein, ed., Genetics and Life Insurance: Medical Underwriting and Social
 Policy (Basic Bioethics). Cambridge: The MIT Press, pp. 173-194. 
Macdonald, A. S., and Yu, F. (2011). ‘The Impact of Genetic Information on the Insurance
 Industry: Conclusions from the ‘Bottom-Up’ Modelling Programme.’ ASTIN Bulletin:
 The Journal of the IAA, 41(2): 343-376. 
 
 
Morrison, P. J., Harding-Lester, S., and Bradley, A. (2011). ‘Uptake of Huntington Disease
 Predictive Testing in a Complete Population.’ Clinical Genetics, 28: 1-6. 
National Human Genome Research Institute. Genome Statute and Legislation Database.
 https://www.genome.gov/policyethics/legdatabase/pubsearch.cfm 
Office for Human Research Protections. (2009; 2016). Federal Policy for the Protection of
 Human Subjects (“Common Rule”, Revised January 15, 2009. Effective July 14, 2009.
 Content last reviewed February 16, 2016) 
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulationsandpolicy/regulations/45-cfr-46/index.html. 
Peikoff K. (2014). ‘Fearing Punishment for Bad Genes.’ The New York Times. April 7:
 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/08/science/fearing-punishment-for-bad-genes.html. 
Rothschild, M., and Stiglitz, J. (1976). ‘Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay
 on the Economics of Imperfect Information.’ The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4):
 629-649. 
Rouse, T., D. Levine, A. Itami, and B. Taylor (2019). ‘Benefit Plan Cybersecurity Considerations:
 A Recordkeeper and Plan Perspective,’ in J. Agnew and O. S. Mitchell (eds.), The
 Disruptive Impact of FinTech on Retirement Systems. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
 Press, pp. xxx–xxx. 
Taylor, D. H., Cook-Deegan, R. M., Hiraki, S., Roberts, J. S., Blazer, D. G., and Green, R. C.
 (2010). ‘Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s and Long-Term Care Insurance.’ Health 
 Affairs, 29(1): 102-108. 
US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (2008). The Genetic Information
 Nondiscrimination Act of 2008. https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/gina.cfm.  
 
 
Zick, C. D., Mathews, C. J., and Roberts, J. S. (2005). ‘Genetic Testing for Alzheimer's Disease
 and its Impact on Insurance Purchasing Behavior.’ Health Affairs (Millwood), 24(2):
 483-490. 
131 
 
Yes No Partial 
Canada 
Finlanda 
Francea 
Germanya 
Irelanda 
New Zealand 
South Africa 
Swedena 
Turkey 
The United Kingdoma 
Austria 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
South Korea 
Spain 
Switzerland 
Australia 
Canada 
Greece 
New Zealand 
South Africa 
 
Table 5.1.  Moratoria on the use of genetic information by life insurance companies 
 
Note:  a The amounts and expiration dates vary 
 
Source: Knoppers et al. (2004) 
